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Since the publication of Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State, and War (1959), much 
research and theory about international relations has been organized by his 
three levels of analysis: individual, state, and international system. 1 Other 
analytic categories have been used (interest groups, bureaucratic politics, 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations). Nevertheless, most of 
the major debates in international relations (e.g., realism, neorealism, 
liberalism, institutionalism) draw on concepts that are theoretically organized 
around the state, national society, and international system, i.e., around Waltz's 
second and third levels.
While these levels of analysis have provided useful categories for organizing 
our research in international relations, they also direct our attention to a 
pronounced gap within the discipline as a whole between domestic politics and 
international relations. Many would say that recognition of differences between 
these fields is just as it should be. Domestic society and the international 
system are demonstrably different.* The latter is a competitive anarchy where 
formally similar states rely on self-help and power bargaining to resolve 
conflict. Domestic society (not system) is, by contrast, rule-based. Conflicts are 
resolved through appeal to institutions and law. International politics is 
concerned with survival; domestic politics has to do with life within the polis. 
While this view is stylized, the core distinction between domestic and 
international politics nevertheless survives and drives our thinking, often in 
ways not explicitly recognized.
Two general hypotheses can be advanced to account for the distance between 
comparative and international politics. The first is that it is due to the relentless 
academic division of labor. As scholarly specializations become more and more 
refined, problems of integration naturally occur. Subfields become more 
specialized and less accessible to the academic community at large. According 
to this view, the effort to provide cross-level integration represents a nostalgic 1
1 Other sources in the systemic or "third-image" tradition are Walt (1987); Posen (1984); 
and Gilpin (1981). For an interesting early attempt to identify second-image sources of 
foreign policy, see Rosenau (1967). For an approach which links international relations 
with domestic politics and argues that changes in domestic structure and policies affect 
outcomes, see Katzenstein (1978). It is important to note that the work of Walt and Posen 
is not hostile to translation into explanations of foreign policy in the way that Waltz’s 
systemic international relations certainly is. For a thorough account of the possibilities of 




























































































yearning for past times when renaissance scholars grasped domestic and 
international politics holistically. However, gaps due to this type of disciplinary 
fragmentation are in principle surmountable.2 The second explanation is that 
both fields are intellectually autonomous, stand on their own foundations, and 
cannot be reduced to one another. Gaps due to differences of this type are not 
easily bridged. Some may argue that they are in principle unbridgeable. One 
strong account of this second position is provided by Kenneth Waltz, whose 
Theory o f International Politics (1979)3 argues for the autonomous —hence 
nonreducible— character of systemic international relations theory. The 
structures of the international system do not have domestic counterparts in the 
same way that domestic social structures do not have parallel microcosms at the 
individual level. If this position is believed, it rules out explanatory 
reductionism. i.e. the explanation of international phenomena by reference to 
second or first image factors. It does not necessarily rule out other bridge­
building efforts.
Three possibilities for making these cross-level connections will be explored:
(1) strategic interactions and two-level games; (2) the second-image reversed;4 
and (3) the domestification of international politics. In working out the 
possibilities of each approach, I rely on a Kuhnian exemplar in the first two 
categories. The first approach is set out and explained in Double-Edged 
Diplomacy, edited by Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam 
(1993). The second approach is used by Ronald Rogowski in Commerce and 
Coalitions (1989). The third approach does not have a representative book 
under review.5 I will draw on some literature on international law, in particular 
on the "constitutionalization" of the European Union under the Rome Treaty, 
Single European Act, and Maastricht Treaty.
2 One suggestion might be to rely upon generalists as "integrative experts," as in effect 
specialists in the connections among subdisciplinary bodies of knowledge. For 
imaginative suggestions along these lines, see Campbell (1969).
3 For example, if the distribution of capabilities is multipolar, we cannot say that country x 
is multipolar. The group property in this case is configurative rather than distributional 
(tall groups are on average made up of tall individuals). While information on the units is 
used, the composition of this partial information is different from the units themselves. 
The elementary units are the states. This is a question of ontology. But the configuration 
of state properties creates a new variable, in this case the distribution of capabilities.
4 The phrase "second image reversed” was coined by Peter Gourevitch (1978). The two- 
level game approach was pioneered by Robert D. Putnam (1988).
5 Nevertheless, in this section, I will rely heavily on research in international law, in 





























































































In the remainder of this essay I will proceed as follows. First, since there are 
several problems of a meta-theoretical nature related to my focus on the 
connections between domestic and international politics, I address them briefly. 
Specifically, they concern the connection between the agent-structure and the 
levels of analysis debates and the reductionism controversy. Second, I will 
examine the literature under consideration and in so doing I will discuss the 
three approaches previously mentioned. Finally, I will offer some concluding 
comments on cross-level theories and how these approaches may themselves be 
compared and contrasted.
Meta-Theoretical Issues
(1) Levels of Analysis Versus Agents/Structures
Discussion of levels of analyses, and the research programs associated with 
these levels, quickly gets involved with ontological questions.6 There is a 
reason for this. Waltz's levels of analysis are not theoretically innocent. There 
are other ways to structure the possibilities for thinking about international 
relations. For example, there are the centers and peripheries of Wallerstein's 
world system theory (1974) and Cardoso and Faletto's dependency theory 
(1978), the global classes of Resnick, Sinisi, and Wolff (1985), and the social 
forces, states, and ideas of Robert Cox's Gramscian approach (1986). These 
concepts are difficult to match with Waltz's levels since they are neither subsets 
nor aggregations of neorealist theory. Stephen Gill's global capitalist hegemony 
(1990) can't be accessed either by progressive aggregation of Waltzian 
primitive concepts (such as the distribution of power) or by unpacking his most 
global (systemic) properties. That is, there is no way to go from Waltz’s 
concept of multipolarity or bipolarity to Gill’s concept of global hegemonic 
class. Waltz’s framework, based on an ontology of states, is one and only one 
way of organizing contending approaches. The different approaches will affect 
not only our answers but even the questions we can ask. It should not be 
surprising that dependency theory and Gramscian approaches to world order are 
not part of the neorealist research program.
6 It is often said that levels provoke discussion of an ontological and epistemological sort. 
However, in a strict sense, issues of epistemology do not seem to be involved at all. 
Epistemology raises questions of theory, albeit the theory of knowledge. Ontology, on the 
other hand, concerns the ultimate nature of our subject matter. What entities, relations, 
and even logical operations do we admit? Ontology affects theory but does not uniquely 
determine specific theories. It is permissive and constraining, providing a kind of 
intellectual architecture that allows and rules out certain theories. For example, a dualist 




























































































Discussions of reductionist», systemic effects, and whether "the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts" are often confusing and are carried out within 
frameworks that don't allow us to arrive at useful conclusions. Two strategies 
are particularly unhelpful. The first strategy (exemplified by structuration 
theory)7 starts by identifying a set of macro concepts but defines these concepts 
in such a way that disaggregation is impossible. Individuals are embedded 
within structures logically. Both structure and agent become parts of an internal 
relation. To separate the two for causal purposes violates the definition. The 
second strategy, inspired by methodological individualism, starts from the 
opposite end, with the individual, but proceeds to expand the environment of 
individuals to include interactions with other individuals, memberships with 
other (groups), shared feelings (group loyalty, solidarity) and composition rules 
(rules relating individuals to social wholes). The former approach defines social 
properties as inherently non-reducible, as mutually constituted and co­
determined entities (Wendt, 1987). The latter defines all social properties as 
combinations of parts and part processes. By expanding the vocabulary of the 
individual level to include complex interactions and even emergent effects, and 
by insisting that such effects are built from the bottom up —no matter how 
complex the chemistry— macro theorizing is rendered impossible. A complex 
social accounting replaces social theory. In both cases, tasks which are 
potentially theoretical are preempted (and made definitional) by the way one 
organizes categories. Yet neither reductionism nor systemic theory is inherently 
fallacious. I argue that it makes sense to allow for (i.e. make possible) systemic 
effects (and reduction) and that doing so is not ipso facto obscurantist.8 A first- 
approximation definition of systemic effect is an effect due to the arrangement 
(configuration) of information about the units, rther than information about the 
units themselves. Whether the whole is greater than the sum of its parts is an 
interesting issue, but the answer to this question lies in whether composition 
rules (rules specifying interactions) count on behalf of the parts or the whole. 
Without answering this question a priori, the above approach provides a 
structure within which it can be answered in theoretical and empirical terms.
(2) Reductionist» and Systemic Theory
7 See Giddens ( 1979), especially chapter 2 (“Agency, Structure”). Alexander E. Wendt’s 
work begins with “the Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”
(1987). Dessler’s contribution to this debate is David Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the 
Agent-Structure Debate?” ( 1989). Also see Wendt, “Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory 
Gap in International Relations” (1991); and Hollis and Smith, “Beware of Gurus:
Structure and Action in International Relations” (1991).
8 To "allow for" simply means to provide the conceptual-logical space to pursue these 





























































































Bridges between comparative and International politics 
(1) Two-Level Games
Originally inspired by Robert Putnam's 1988 article "Diplomacy and domestic 
politics: The logic of two-level games" and nurtured by a year-long study group 
at Stanford's Center for the Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences during 
1988-1989, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics (Evans, et al., 1993) brings together eleven case studies and two 
analytical chapters on international bargaining. The editors, as well as the 
contributors, seem dissatisfied with the unitary actor assumption often invoked 
in international relations theory, as well as the tendency of systemic theories to 
underpredict outcomes.9 Variations in systemic structure, particularly in the 
distribution of power, simply do not provide enough information to make 
specific predictions, either about the preferences of domestic leaders or about 
the outcomes of the negotiations themselves. There is also a revealed 
dissatisfaction with comparative politics approaches to manage these problems 
of underdetermination by offering descriptively rich accounts while leaving 
blank key portions of the theoretical story. A third dissatisfaction, the central 
one animating the book, relates to a standing partition between the chessboards 
of domestic politics and the international system. Analysis of moves and 
strategies (which are sequences of moves) on each board separately are 
common. Utilization of the analytical results of one level as inputs for the other 
are less common but not rare. The third category, simultaneous analysis of both 
games — the integration of domestic and international chessboards — is almost 
nonexistent. This book seeks to fill this void.
The central analytical device used to span the domestic-international divide is 
the two-level game. By itself it is not a theory but closer to a metaphor. It draws 
our attention to key actors and directs us to analyze the intersecting influences 
that converge around the Janus-faced state, facing simultaneously outward to 
the international system and inward toward various domestic constituencies.
9 To "underpredict" means that the theoretical information is insufficient to generate 
specific predictions about outcomes. Underpredictive theories come in several forms. 
They may provide information about necessary but not sufficient causes, may rest on 
probabilitistic rather than deterministic reasoning, or may provide background 
information without stating the proximal causes. In a sense, any theory which is statistical, 
or lacks a necessary and sufficient inferential logic, or explains the limits within which 
behavior will fall without supplying point predictions, is underdetermined, hence 
underpredictive. International relations theory is not alone in this regard but systemic 
international relations theory, by explicitly arguing in terms of limits and possibilities 




























































































Each leader, called a COG for chief of government, must interact with and 
solve problems in two arenas. The COG must strike acceptable deals with his or 
her international partners and must ratify such deals within the relevant 
domestic institutions. There is an acceptability set, the set of deals agreeable to 
other COGs, and a win set, those deals which can be ratified domestically. No 
temporal priority or logical sequence is presumed. Both levels are important 
simultaneously. Both act as constraints and resources. Both are relevant for 
strategy at two levels. In addition, COGs may have utility functions of their 
own, preferences that may be constrained by, but are not identical with, those of 
their constituents. Two COG agents (or sets of agents), two constituencies 
(domestic actors), and two different rule systems must be taken into account.
Beyond this skeletal model, there is much flexibility in the way analyses can be 
carried out. The richness of institutional detail varies from chapter to chapter as 
does the focus on interest group life, the force of public opinion, and the 
importance of changing leadership, political parties, and electoral majorities. 
Chapters vary from the information-rich, relatively transparent political system 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, with well-developed, organizationally 
strong interest groups and public opinion, to the clan-based, personalistic rule 
in Somalia. In general, COGs in advanced liberal democracies were much more 
constrained by domestic influences than COGs in less developed countries.
The core of the book, lodged between a superb introduction (Moravcsik, 1993) 
and conclusion (Evans, 1993), are eleven case study chapters, most of them 
built around an explicit cross-national, longitudinal, or cross-sectoral 
comparison. These chapters cover much ground, including security issues 
(intermediate nuclear forces, Berlin crisis), economic issues (computers in 
Brazil, U.S. feed grain exports to European Community), and human rights 
issues in U.S.-Argentine and U.S.-Guatemalan relations. There are chapters 
dealing primarily with North-South relations (Pastor, Martin and Sikkink, 
Stein, Kahler, 1993), East-West relations (Eichenberg, Snyder, 1993), and 
West-West relations (Moravcsik, Eichengreen and Uzan, Milner, Kraus, and in 
part Odell, 1993).
Chapters vary greatly in terms of the level of institutional detail provided. 
Eichenberg's chapter (Eichenberg, 1993) dealing with the decision to deploy 
and then remove the intermediate nuclear forces provides details about the 
West German political system that are relevant to the making of agreements 
among COGs and their ratification domestically. The West German system of 
proportional representation allowed minority views to be represented, a fact 
that created problems for the Federal Republic's governing coalition. Germany's 




























































































constraints on Germany's leaders. The bargaining behavior of Schmidt, Kohl, 
Carter, and Reagan is difficult to understand apart from the domestic 
constraints in both countries. By contrast, Stein's findings suggest that domestic 
institutional constraints (apart from elections) are not very important. Sadat in 
Egypt and Begin in Israel were able to alter their domestic win sets by 
manipulating "domestic coalitions and procedures." (Stein, 1993:92) What 
counted instead were domestic economic crises and elections.
In explaining different outcomes of U.S. human rights policies in Argentina and 
Guatemala, Martin and Sikkink (1993) find that size of the win set is less 
important than the existence of transnational coalitions of human rights 
supporters. In Argentina they existed and U.S. influence was successful. In 
Guatemala they did not and U.S. policy failed. Perhaps extreme forms of 
brutality and repression still work but they seem confined to all-or-nothing 
solutions based on isolation and increasing opportunity cost of integration into 
the international economy. Stein finds that local and global power balances 
matter little in the negotiations at Camp David, in contrast to other studies 
(Telhami, 1990). She also found that the instrumental manipulation of domestic 
win sets to increase bargaining power did not succeed (leaders were not 
convinced about hand-tying arguments). Curiously, COGs were more 
successful manipulating win sets of their counterparts. Moravcsik (1993) in his 
chapter on cooperation in the production of weapons systems, provides still 
another variation on the two-level game model. He identifies two counter­
intuitive findings. First COGs of different countries where arms production 
agreements were being made were closer to one another than to their own 
domestic constituencies. Agreements were easier among countries than within 
countries. Second, the incentive structures facing firms were generally more 
conflictual than those facing states. Thus domestic and international politics, 
usually identified with conflict and "we-they" thinking, is associated here with 
relatively benign incentives. Economics, traditionally the realm of harmony of 
interests and the discovery of areas of joint gains, is associated with conflictual 
incentives. Moravcsik finds that the major obstacle to negotiating agreements 
stems not from international structural factors, nor to the concerns of states with 
relative gains, but from the sensitivities of domestic economic actors to 
distributive questions, in particular how to apportion the research, 
development, and production tasks among powerful domestic interests.
Moravcsik does an excellent job of theorizing (rather than simply describing) 
domestic interests. In some of the other chapters, domestic interests either 
change exogenously or respond to factors so specific to time and place that they 
are not reproducible in other contexts. As such they lack generalizability. In 




























































































domestic interest of big firms and the success-failure of negotiators is the 
global market position of domestic arms-producing firms (1992:136).
An important component of thematic coherence has to do with the overall 
design. This is rarely an issue that comes up at all in edited collections. Design 
considerations are thought to apply to particular studies — not to collections of 
them. The book employs the logic of research design at two levels, the first 
nested within the second. At the level of individual chapters, there is almost 
always a strategic contrast between countries, sectors (or issue areas), or time 
periods. Eichenberg examines changes across historical episodes and Stein 
employs concepts of learning across time. Moravcsik, Milner, and Kraus 
explicitly employ predominantly sectoral contrasts. Eichengreen and Uzan, 
Martin and Sikkink, and Kahler employ country comparisons, while Odell and 
Pastor exploit contrasts among issues and countries. These carefully chosen 
cases illustrate the inferential gains associated with employing theoretically 
informed comparisons.
The second level of design has to do with the logic of case selection as a whole. 
Here the focus shifts from the contrasts within chapters to the contrasts across 
chapters. The relevant contrasts are not between construction and 
semiconductors and Jamaica and Somalia but rather between Jamaica and 
Somalia as a pair and Nicaragua and Panama as a pair. As in a German 
Rahmenerzahlung, where a story is told within a story, the units within the 
individual case studies are repositioned to take on different meaning at the level 
of the book as a whole. This is more than a question of scope of coverage. It 
also has to do with evaluating hypotheses. The studies of Jamaica and Somalia, 
Guatemala and Argentina, and Nicaragua and Panama illustrate, despite 
internal variations, the considerable differences between these cases and the 
German-U.S. INF dispute or the French-German negotiations over weapons 
collaboration. In the former countries, civil society is much weaker and 
domestic constraints on leaders' strategies not as strong. The attention paid to 
their constituencies by Schmidt and Kohl was much greater than anything 
witnessed in Somalia, Egypt, or Guatemala. Thus, as Evans points out in the 
conclusion, case selection served two principles at once: increasing the scope 
and generality of the empirical work and explaining the differences in outcomes 
within pairs of countries (1993:398).
Two classic principles of research design are internal and external validity. As 
outlined by Campbell and Stanley (1963), the former is a necessary component 
of all non-exploratory designs. Internal validity has to do with the basic 
question of what, if anything, made a difference. To answer this question, even 




























































































variables and must control, to whatever extent possible, for confounding 
influences. The latter concern, external validity, relates to the generalizability 
of findings. If x affects y within Germany and France, does this same relation 
hold in other countries? Internal validity involves tests of hypotheses. External 
validity involves the scope of the results. The nested design of Double-Edged 
Diplomacy responds to both concerns.
A second strength of the book is that it has an exceptionally strong introduction 
and conclusion. Both serve as excellent road maps for the book as a whole (one 
prospective, one retrospective), while the introduction establishes the 
intellectual agenda and the conclusion reflects about the unfinished business 
ahead.
Moravcsik's introduction (1993) does far more than introduce the chapter 
contributions and set the mood for the book as a whole. It also provides a 
template for integrating international relations and comparative politics. His 
starting point is that "pure" international relations theories, because they are 
indeterminate, must permit domestic factors to enter, if only in an ad hoc, 
unsystematic way. Domestic politics should not be treated in piecemeal fashion, 
nor should it be placed in the service of shoring up the shortcomings of 
systemic approaches. Domestic politics is not necessarily about what is 
theoretically messy and intractable, and systemic international theories are not 
necessarily about what is parsimonious. Thus, domestic political theory should 
not simply fill in the detail left unexplained by systemic approaches, the 
"residual variance" approach. Instead, domestic politics approaches may 
specialize theoretically in any number of ways, e.g., in the activities of different 
interest groups and in the representational logic of domestic institutions. 
Theories of international politics may tell us more about power and bargaining.
Evan's conclusion (1993) provides an excellent synthesis of the book's findings. 
He reviews the patterns of evidence, even the negative ones, and provides a 
sense of direction about where the important questions remain. Since one of the 
major control variables in the design was time (most of the comparisons were 
from the post-1945 period), future work on two-level games could profitably 
add the historical dimension.
A third set of contributions centers on the findings of the case studies. One 
negative finding is that overall systemic theories, based either on power- 
security or economic vulnerability, are inadequate in the most direct sense that 
they underpredict or mispredict the outcomes. The Martin and Sikkink chapter 
(1993) provides the clearest example of this inadequacy. Argentina, far stronger 




























































































while Guatemala holds out. There are many other examples, including the 
inability to explain the positions of Sadat and Begin in the Middle East (Stein, 
1993) or the changes in Schmidt and Kohl's orientation in Germany 
(Eichenberg, 1993), on the basis of systemic factors.
Perhaps surprisingly, the weaknesses of systemic theory were not compensated 
by a strong theory (or theories) of domestic society. Evans, in reviewing the 
results, notes the absence of a strong constituency-driven logic in the chapters 
taken together, and this absence is particularly noted in the beginning, agenda­
setting phase of the negotiations. Domestic forces become stronger as the 
negotiating process unfolds. Of course, the pinnacles of state power are not 
taken into account when noting this weakness. Presumably, if the agendas of 
political leaders were taken into account, the results would be different. But 
then, the nets thrown out would be quite comprehensive, encompassing 
domestic society, domestic politics, and the international system. Nevertheless, 
an important point remains. Our Janus-faced leader is neither a residue of 
systemic forces nor a passive reflection of societal forces. Both neorealism and 
society-centered pluralism are inadequate (not to say wrong) from the start.
Pursuing the negative findings, I think it is fair to say that no general positive 
conclusion was reached about the importance of the size of the win set or the 
ability to shrink or enlarge these sets at will. The theoretical expectation was 
that the leader with the smaller win set would be in the stronger position, since 
he or she would have only those options closer to the preferred position. Along 
the same lines, if political coalitions are fluid, leaders can easily stitch together 
their support base, thus changing at will what is ratifiable. But as Evans points 
out, leaders seldom tied hands (they preferred flexibility) and when they did so, 
"...their adversaries simply did not buy the argument." (Evans, 1993:402) There 
is a dual irony here, which perhaps retards the ability to play the "hands-tying" 
strategy. Among advanced constitutional democracies, where institutions are 
thick and organizational life is strong, rule-based or group-based opposition is 
plausible but transparent. Leaders may have their hands tied but this is not a 
tactic that can be exploited. If democracies keep few secrets, there are few 
informational asymmetries to exploit. Among less developed countries, where 
constitutional restraints are fewer and group life not as well organized, leaders 
may have great autonomy but since this autonomy is recognized by counterpart 
COGs, there is little room to exploit this freedom.
One important positive finding is that domestic institutions are important. 
Regardless of whether the forces confronting the COG originate in the 
international system or domestic politics, they are not transmitted to decision 




























































































these forces and in constituting the relevant actors. In 1934, the Trade Act was 
passed in response to some of the negative policy consequences of the 
Congress during the Depression. This Act removed much of the authority for 
making trade policy from the legislative to the executive branch. Greater 
executive autonomy meant a broader buffer between the protectionist feelings 
of mass publics and the policy-making process. Along the same lines, the 
system of proportional representation, for France in 1934 and Schmidt and Kohl 
during the seventies and eighties, seemed to make governing coalitions fragile. 
This was especially the case for the Daladier government, which attended the 
World Economic Conference in 1933. The Daladier government was but one of 
eleven ministries to hold power from May 1932 to May 1936 (Eichengreen and 
Uzan, 1993:219).10 The leeway of French representatives was limited to say 
the least.
The importance of institutions and organized group life are noteworthy in their 
absence. In Miles Kahler's chapter (1993) on the IMF and Jamaica and Somalia, 
domestic institutions were weak and many latent groups, in Bentley's 
terminology, were not capable of organizing to their advantage. In Somalia, 
Siyaad Barre was not willing to upset the delicate balance of clan interests on 
which his regime's support rested (Kahler, 1993:389). Even in Jamaica, further 
advanced in democratic terms, group losers were better organized than potential 
winners, and it was not at all clear that this pattern was due to the relative 
concentration of benefits and losses. The potential losers in effect vetoed an 
agreement with the IMF that would have brought substantial benefits to small 
farmers, consumers, and the informal sector (Kahler, 1993:390), and this quite 
apart from whether or not potential winners could have bought out losers. The 
Pareto concept has not yet taken root in many parts of the less developed world. 
Neither Barre nor Seaga availed himself of the opportunity to mobilize key 
constituencies who might have benefited from an agreement, an outcome that 
perhaps points to an incentive incompatibility between politicians and the 
economy.
Finally, out of all the predictors of successful outcomes of negotiations — size 
of acceptability sets, size of win sets, magnitude of consumer surplus, outcomes 
in accordance with power, juste retour — one of the most important 
unsuspected factors was the expectation (or fear) of absolute loss. Indeed, this 
was the central theme of Stein's chapter (1993) on negotiations in the Middle 
East, but it also figured indirectly in other chapters. For example, Odell's 
emphasis on the credibility of threats as a determinant of bargaining outcomes





























































































rests in part not just on the strategies pursued but also on the loss to the U.S. if 
the threat were not successful (Odell, 1993:237). The greater the perception of 
loss (relative to no agreement at all), the greater the urge to fashion some 
agreement. And this seemed to be true regardless of whether the agreement 
served some independent end or was the goal itself, i.e., an agreement to take 
home to the constituents.
Despite my praise of Double-Edged Diplomacy, I have a number of criticisms. 
My first critique centers on design, an issue about which I had many positive 
things to say. Many of the chapters selected cases because they differed on 
outcome. This amounts to sampling on the dependent variable, a strategy that 
has its limitations (Geddes, 1990)." The most obvious limitation is that there 
may be no relation at all between independent and dependent variables, and one 
way the absence of a relationship may be in evidence is by the absence of 
change in the outcome variable. In Figure 1, the independent variable, x, is 
assured of changing by design while the behavior of the dependent variable is 















1' Geddes' chief criticism of selection on the dependent variable has to do with truncating 
the variance on the dependent variable, e.g., by only looking at successful or unsuccessful 
outcomes. The book under review completely avoided this problem by picking cases with 




























































































The pattern of outcomes is consistent with the independent variable having an 
effect. However, it is quite possible that no relationship at all is observed, so 
that variation in the independent variable makes no difference. This is 






















In this figure, cases cluster in cells 1 and 3, displaying high scores on the 
dependent variable across different scores of the independent variable. 
Selection on the dependent variable rules out this pattern.
What is the practical impact of the removal of the "no-difference" outcome? On 
the principle that a theory is stronger to the extent that it withstands more 
difficult tests, this difficulty increases as a direct function of the falsifiable 
content of the theory. Thus, selecting cases for variation on the dependent 
variable reduces the number of outcomes that are inconsistent with the theory. 
There is a competing hypothesis that is impossible to test when cases are 
selected this way. Furthermore, since many outcomes are overdetermined, in 
the sense that many explanatory factors are consistent with the outcome data, it 
is not clear that this principle of case selection is optimal. Looking backward 
for consistent explanations after the outcome is observed does not provide as 
difficult a test as selecting cases for change in the independent variable to see if 
they are associated with previously specified dependent variables whose values 




























































































The second point relevant to the research design relates to the overarching 
(macro) design, the one within which the case studies are embedded. While 
Evans seems to see this macro design as increasing the scope of the study, thus 
improving external validity, more could have been teased out of the chapters by 
way of internal validity. Table 1 provides a schematic picture of how individual 





Case 1 a | b | * 1
Case 2 a2b2 * 2
Case N a N^N * N
* Cases correspond to chapters.
The cases are chapters which then generate internal comparisons (a jb i to 
aNbN). These internal comparisons are the focus of each of the chapters. The 
logic of design directs each contribution to explore the reasons for different 
outcomes, given similarities in many contextual properties, including systemic 
structures. In addition, there are also across-chapter variations that can be 
exploited, x, ...xN provides another distribution, this one made up of group 
(pairs) parameters. I use means for convenience but the same logic applies to 
distance scores and other parameters. Each pair (or n-tuple) of cases also 
(together) provides a value which as a set forms a new distribution. This new 
distribution now becomes the object of explanation. Why do outcomes become 
more cooperative (or conflictual) over time? From the most historically remote 
cases to the present, does synergy become more or less evident? As institutions 
become denser, say as one shifts comparisons from less developed countries to 
the advanced capitalist countries, does one find that COGs have greater or less 
flexibility? These kinds of questions, more relevant to internal than external 




























































































of these questions, and the difficulty of exerting leverage on them with a pair­
wise focus, suggests that the book would also have benefited from a few macro 
studies.
A second criticism has to do with the book's largely assumptive favorable 
orientation toward general equilibrium analysis over partial equilibrium. 
Indeed, this was a point Putnam made in his 1988 article, in which he criticized 
second-image (domestic causes of international effects) and second-image 
reversed (international causes of domestic effects) as "merely 'partial 
equilibrium' analyses." (1988:434) I am sympathetic with Putnam's goal of 
looking at the complete picture and not resting with a one-way analysis of the 
links between domestic and international politics. But this comprehensive 
picture could come about in two different ways: by combining partial analyses 
into a unified account or by conducting a simultaneous analysis of domestic 
and international levels. I argue that there is more to be said for the former 
approach than is conceded by the contributors, that partial models provide one 
way to build comprehensive models, and that such an approach may be more 
practically attainable than models that are comprehensive from the start.
In economics, partial equilibrium analysis is used to work out the prices and 
quantities that are produced within commodity and factor markets separately.12 
Supply and demand curves within markets are the operative forces. As 
Mansfield points out, "...each market is regarded as independent and self- 
contained” (1982:412) and local changes in prices in one market do not have 
significant impact on other markets. This assumption is not regarded as true in 
any final sense but rather as a useful first approximation to understanding a 
complex picture.
To describe the partial model in this fashion is to grasp the reasons that 
comprehensive models are preferred. We all know that the world is not 
partitioned into watertight containers, that processes which seem quite local 
probably have far-reaching if indirect effects, and that feedback and interaction 
are likely over the long and perhaps short run. However, while terms such ao 
"interactive", synergistic", and "simultaneous" can have precise meaning, they 
also have a halo of unanalyzed connotations around them. In the abstract, apart 
from demonstrations of usefulness, interactive and synergistic are likely to be 
preferred to additive and separate. The underlying two-game approach, and the 
individual chapters applying them, would have been more impressive if they
12 For discussions of partial and general equilibrium analyses, see Mansfield (1982:412- 




























































































had pursued the limits of the partial model and demonstrated the superiority of 
the comprehensive approach in a value-added way.
1 do not make this suggestion in an off-hand ("you should have tried this") way. 
Let me attempt to make the case for partial equilibrium analysis. Starting from 
the premise that everything is connected to everything else (no closed systems), 
we can also note that some things are more connected than others. In the 
physical world nuclear forces are much more powerful than molecular forces 
which in turn are more powerful than molar forces. In human affairs, we can 
speculate that individuals are more cohesive and tightly connected (despite "the 
divided se lf) than families, families more so than small groups, small groups 
more so than villages, villages more so than countries, and countries more so 
than international systems.
The "relative integrity of parts" alluded to above can be conveniently described 
in terms of relative levels of interdependency, functional autonomy, common 
fate, and the stability of "local" equilibria. A tightly coupled subsystem would 
demonstrate a high ratio of internal to external interactions, high functional 
autonomy, jointly experienced harm or benefit with other parts, and a local 
equilibrium that is invariant with respect to large changes in external 
constraints.
In "The Architecture of Complexity" Herbert Simon (1962, 1982:210) tells us 
that in complex hierarchically organized systems, variables may interrelate with 
one another irrespective of changes in their environments, within certain levels. 
For example, the day-to-day operations in a bureaucracy may be unperturbed by 
changes in higher level environments. Garbage may be collected, school boards 
may decide the content of biology textbooks, and roads may be built without 
setting off national alarms, at least most of the time. There are two issues 
involved. The first has to do with the strengths of subsystemic forces relative to 
those connecting these forces to the whole. The second has to do with the 
conditions under which the subsystem is stable. When subsystemic forces are 
strong, and when this subsystem retains its characteristic patterns under a large 
range of variation in the whole system, Simon speaks of the "near- 
decomposability" of subsystems (Simon, 1962, 1982:217). This partial 
decomposability allows us to treat systems in isolation from one another as a 
first approximation, to create modules or "islands of theory" for the purpose of 
later integration.
The superiority of the general over the partial equilibrium approach is easiest to 
make in horizontally specialized market settings. There is no clear hierarchical 




























































































markets, which is not to deny that the capital-labor relations — as a social 
relation — is free from hierarchy. In neoclassical theory, markets are set off 
from one another in terms of technical properties (mobility, substitutability, 
productivity). This makes it easier to integrate their respective behavior.
But social and political theory is different from the theory of market behavior 
precisely on this point. Politics is not just about exchange behavior among co­
equal entities. It is also about power and control. Of course, the book 
recognizes this—why else the focus on negotiations? But if political life 
implies hierarchy, not just in the precise sense of power relations, but also in 
the broader meaning of a social organizing principle, then general equilibrium 
may make less sense. The greater the hierarchy, the tighter the part connections, 
and the broader the bonds defining the local equilibria, the more sense it makes 
to understand the parts first, reserving for second-order the task of linking them 
into a coherent whole.
Of the chapters in this book, the one by Snyder (1993) goes farthest in pushing 
the partial equilibrium model. He first carefully analyzes the parts (the behavior 
of the Soviet Union and the United States) and then links them sequentially. It 
is a model based on mutual interaction, and feedback, but not simultaneous and 
synergistic behavior. Snyder himself offers a reason why there might be less 
applicability of the two-level game in his case study, viz., there are few cross­
county coalitions in the area of security. But despite his qualification, I would 
like to have seen the limits of the partial model probed more if only as a 
precursor to the more general analysis.
(2) The Second-Image Reversed
In 1941, Wolfgang Stopler and Paul Samuelson authored a remarkable article, 
"Protection and real wages." The basic argument had to do with changing 
relative income as a function of changing exposure to international trade. What 
they showed quite convincingly in theoretical terms is that free trade harms 
(relatively) those owners of factors which are relatively scarce from a world 
point of view and benefits those who are holders of relatively abundant factors. 
While Stopler and Samuelson did not ask us to focus on distinct classes in a 
sociological or Marxian sense, the article directed attention to land, labor, and 
capital as productive factors and to the accrual of income resulting from 
ownership and use of these factors. Starting from given facts about relative 
factor abundance and scarcity, individuals gain or lose depending on their 
holdings of land, labor, and capital. To this extent, "Protection and Real 





























































































While the Stopler and Samuelson article set forth an important thesis rich with 
suggestions for income distribution and class cleavages, it was largely 
unrecognized in the political science literature. No doubt this in part reflected 
the mutual isolation of economics and political science. This isolation is 
corrected, and Stopler and Samuelson are introduced to the literature on trade 
politics by Ronald Rogowski in Commerce and Coalitions. In this book 
Rogowski argues that the Stopler-Samuelson theorem need not stop with 
changes in relative incomes. These changes are not random (they occur quite 
predictably) and they are unlikely to be accepted passively. Those who gain 
(lose) are likely to understand this and take action to further (resist) these 
trends.
The economic cleavages caused by trade exposure provide the raw material of 
politics. Cleavages, by themselves, represent only economic data. The journey 
from here to organized groups, coalition-formation, and influence on 
governmental decision makers is a long one.
Rogowski's basic argument is that economic cleavages have political 
consequences of a predictable nature. Three reasonable assumptions are made: 
that groups which benefit and lose will be aware of it and try to further (or 
retard) the changes; that those who increase wealth will expand political 
influence; and that political entrepreneurs will invent mechanisms to overcome 
obstacles to collective action (1989:4-5). And in what is a most refreshing 
assumption, actual and potential losers will not be impeded from organizing to 
prevent loss because of the total potential welfare gains or by the promise that 
winners will buy out losers (1989:17).
If exposure to trade creates political divisions, it should do so in a determinate 
way. Starting from the three-factor model of economics (land, labor, and 
capital) Rogowski distinguishes advanced from less developed societies in 
terms of capital-abundance and scarcity. Given this basic division, four major 














































































































- Land - Labor
Scarce: Scarce:
- Capital - Capital
- Labor - Land
Figure 3
An economy may be (1) abundant in both capital and land and scarce in labor; 
(2) abundant in capital and labor, scarce in land; (3) abundant in land and 
scarce in capital and labor; and (4) abundant in labor, scarce in capital and land.
As spare as these combinations are, they generate rich possibilities for politics. 
When labor and capital are on opposite sides (cells 1 and 4), class conflict 
results. When land stands alone arranged against labor and capital (cells 2 and 
3), rural-urban conflict results. For example, looking at cell 2, both labor and 
capital should benefit from increasing exposure to trade (the entire urban 
sector). Both urban workers and capitalists should stand together against 
landowners and peasants in support of free trade.
A different kind of urban-rural conflict should arise in cell 3 when land is the 
relatively abundant factor and labor and capital are relatively scarce. Rogowski 
terms these "frontier” societies where farmers and pastoralists are holders of 
abundant factors and hence favor free trade, against the interests of workers and 
capitalists. The other two cells (1 and 4) predict class conflict, since labor and 




























































































These are the pure analytics of Rogowski's theory, the logical combinations and 
the political patterns, grosso modo, likely to result from these combinations.
Commerce and Coalitions is a powerful book, one that has broken new 
ground in the connections between comparative and international politics. 
Rogowski brilliantly utilizes our collective capital stock and creatively extends 
the logic of Stopler and Samuelson's half-century old essay into the political 
realm. Part of the force of the book lies in the relentless way in which the 
implications of well-known ideas are pursued, another part in the rather 
intriguing ways in which specific historical episodes are reinterpreted 
(Bismarck's marriage of "Iron and Rye," the coalition of Western agrarians with 
Northern industrialists against slavery, the effect of the European Union on 
groups within member states). While the book is simple in its appeal to a few 
factors to explain a great range of historical examples, it is by no means 
obvious. Indeed, there are many non-obvious implications of the theory and I 
would imagine that the book will provoke numerous debates in the economic 
history journals.
Second, the empirical work, although far from conclusive, is at a minimum very 
suggestive of the theory's explanatory power. Rogowski does not claim to 
provide a definitive test of his theory, but only a series of plausibility probes 
and illustrative case studies. At a minimum, the basic theory is suggestively 
applied to late nineteenth century Germany, the modem European Community 
(now European Union), slavery and populism in the U.S., the U.S. electoral 
realignment of 1896, the governing coalitions of Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia, Barrington Moore's interpretation of German fascism, sixteenth 
century Europe, and the decline of the Roman Empire.
Third, as indicated by my earlier comments, the level of analysis at which 
Rogowski carries out his research is welcome to this reviewer. In domestic and 
international political economy, research is often pitched at the level of the 
international system, the national economy, the industrial sector, or the firm. 
The international system emphasizes the overall structuring of the international 
division of labor; the nation-state stresses variables such as economic growth, 
distribution, macro-economic policy, and national adjustment styles; the 
industrial sector approach examines variables such as degree of concentration 
of capital, technological volatility, research and development embodied in 
particular sectors; and firm-specific studies focus on management strategies, 
market shares, competitiveness, and so forth.
By contrast, Rogowski focuses on economic factors: land, labor, and capital. 




























































































much to recommend it, especially when one puts on the theoretical lenses for 
the long view. In the short run, the logic of specific sectors may be compelling. 
There may be little overall unity among shoes, clothing, textiles, airplane 
production, chemicals, and automobiles. In a cross-section, or within shorter 
time periods, factors may be viewed as inextricably tied to or "trapped" by 
specific sectors. Over the longer haul, however, factors are mobile. They adjust 
to changes in relative scarcities and preferences.
Another benefit of the factoral approach is that it shifts attention from the 
political correlates of particular economic sectors to a level appropriate to more 
macroscopic factors. The sectoral approach suggests interest groups organized 
along industry (or service, agricultural) lines. The factoral approach points us 
toward broader coalitions of interest groups, political parties, unlikely 
combinations that cross sector lines (iron and rye), and to some extent classes. 
The factoral approach has more obvious links to historical sociology, electoral 
realignments, and the ascendance-decline of major economic groups.
Commerce and Coalitions also has its shortcomings. Perhaps the most striking 
is the gap between cleavages and outcomes. Rogowski recognizes and mentions 
several times that the book is about the relationship between trade and 
economic cleavages, defined in terms of changing income distribution. All well 
and good, but the book would not attract our interest if the story stopped here. 
Cleavages are merely matters of economic fact. They point to objective 
differences in incomes of holders of land, labor, and capital. They become 
politically interesting as people come to recognize their collective 
predicaments, to imagine that they can change their lot, and to mobilize 
politically, through interest groups, political parties, and broad-based 
coalitions. While economic cleavages are important in economic terms, they 
provide only the raw material for political movements. It is "holders of factors 
fiir sich" not "holders of factors an sich" that is important. There was little 
theoretical work on how to make the transition from cleavages to political 
mobilizations to outcomes. In this sense, a more accurate title of the book 
would have been Commerce and Cleavages.
A second limitation concerns the high level of aggregation at which the 
analysis was carried out, namely that of undifferentiated factors. I don't deny 
that Rogowski should have started with the assumption of homogenous factors, 
but I am skeptical about how far analysis can be pushed based on aggregation 
of such diverse forms of labor and capital. Labor, for example, could be 
separated into skilled and unskilled categories. This disaggregation would help 
to explain some of the effects of international competition on U.S. workers 




























































































wages during this period but the higher skilled workers increased their earnings 
somewhat. In other words, real wages of the most and least skilled diverged 
markedly from 1979 to 1989 (Economist,1994:69). The heterogeneity of capital 
is probably as important — if not more so — than the heterogeneity of labor.
Turning to another point, the Stopler-Samuelson theorem assumes mobility of 
factors. If demand for capital-intensive production declines, owners can shift 
capital to labor-intensive sectors. The greater the mobility of factors, the more 
sense it makes to focus on factors, since the important changes will take place 
here. To the extent that factors are trapped within sectors, a sectoral approach is 
implied. But there is another explanation, not completely separate, that should 
be taken into account. Just as factors may be in varying degree trapped inside a 
sector, they also may be trapped inside a country. The restriction of cross- 
border flows of both capital and workers is a case in point. However, the 
difficulty and cost of exiting are variable even absent political controls.
What is the significance of this differential ability to exit? If both labor (scarce) 
and capital (abundant) are trapped inside a country and trade expands, then 
both are threatened by trade more so than under assumptions of international 
mobility. To be sure, capital can gain by moving across sectors, by disinvesting 
in some sectors and investing in others. But this may be a lengthy and 
cumbersome process and one that is impeded by the asset specificity of certain 
kinds of capital as well as the opportunity for rent-seeking. In contrast, with 
international mobility, capital can stay in the same sector and move to a 
different place. Labor, because it is less mobile, is trapped. An important 
outcome, the changing positions of labor and capital on protectionism, may be 
due to differential mobility. This may fall under the heading of short-run 
adjustments to Rogowski, but it is important nonetheless.
Commerce and Coalitions prompts us to think about the relation between 
domestic and international politics and between economics and politics. On the 
latter score I am reminded of how much significance economic theory attaches 
to market adjustments as well as private coping, while political theory is about 
struggling and public coping with the disruptions of the very same market The 
Stopler-Samuelson theorem adds a long-run twist to these adjustment 
processes, downplaying the problems of the transition as frictional in favor of 
the long-run efficiency of the outcome. Depending on the actual mobility of the 
factors involved, the process could take decades or generations. Structural 
adjustment may come eventually because of environmental selection pressure 
rather than behavioral changes on the part of economic agents — evolutionary 




























































































may be replaced by software designers or clerks. Capital in firms that fail may 
reinvest in industries with different factor-intensity profiles..
What economists and political scientists bracket and take for granted differs. 
The economist's "long-run equilibrium" is easily transmuted into the hurly- 
burly world of politics simply by peering within the time frame required for 
these adjustments to take place. For the economist, the hindrances that come 
from sunk costs, a worker's familiarity with a certain productive way of life (a 
job or career — not just an income), inertia, and the time, energy, and 
knowledge required to find new work and investment opportunities, can all be 
blackboxed and treated as frictional resistance. For political science, these 
resistances define an important part of our subject matter.
(3) The Domestification of International Politics
A third bridge between domestic and international politics is provided by the 
concept of domestification of the international system. If the international 
system is a competitive anarchy in which sovereign, constitutionally distinct 
states interact on the basis of power and interest, then domestification describes 
the process by which that system becomes less anarchic, more 
“govemmentalized”.or more rule-governed. The “domestic analogy”13 
(Suganami, 1989) used here suggests a continuum ranging from the most 
anarchic, asocial international system at the one extreme to world government 
and world society at the other. Clearly, these two variables do not have to move 
together. An “anarchical society” is not only possible but central to the work of 
Hedley Bull, and others working within the Groatian tradition (Bull, 1977).14 
Historical international systems are never completely anarchic: some degree of 
rule and common understanding are deeply embedded within the system. 
Nevertheless, this continuum provides an ideal type for assessing the placement 
and movement of concrete international systems.
Inquiring into the conditions which make anarchic international systems more 
like domestic polities forces us to clarify just what it means to be a domestic 
polity, as opposed to a system of states freer of centralized rule. Recognizing 
that we are dealing with ideal types, a domestic polity is taken to be a political
' 3 At its broadest level, the term “domestic analogy” embodies a faith, or “presumptive 
reasoning” as Suganami puts it, “that there are certain similarities between domestic and 
international phenomena” and that “in particular, the conditions of order within states are 
similar to those of order between them; and that therefore those institutions which sustain 
order domestically should be reproduced at the international level.” (1989:1)
14 For a thoughtful treatment of Bull’s work, in the context of a modern debate about 




























































































system characterized by stable authority patterns, patterns of recognized rule, 
i.e. what we commonly call government. While coordinative rules are 
important, as are shared political understandings and background knowledge, 
the strongest test of domestification lies in the existence of specialized 
institutions for making and adjudicating laws and interpretations binding on 
parties. In a certain sense, the domestic analogy relies on the creation of 
hierarchies of norms the most formal of which are laws (legislation). Such a 
hierarchy is better developed (more consistent, more formalized, and more 
complete in its vertical ordering) within domestic polities than among them.
This third approach differs from the other two in an important way. The first 
two approaches take the domestic and international levels as given and inquire 
about the connections between the two in terms of strategic interaction and 
cross-level processes (trade and coalition formation). Models based on mutual 
feedback, or synergy, represent the highest form of synthesis. The third 
approach asks to what extent domestic and international politics differ, in terms 
of deep organizing principles, then interprets these differences as ones of 
degree (not kind), and proceeds to investigate the ways in which the 
international system may acquire the characteristics of domestic politics.
Integrating domestic and international politics, according to the third approach, 
requires the (partial) elimination of the conditions defining separateness. The 
research project underlying this approach is historical and conceptual— 
historical because this process necessarily unfolds over time, conceptual 
because it is not just “there” for us to see but needs to be studied according to 
certain concepts. Unlike the other two approaches, this one does not involve 
cross-level theorizing. Or more accurately, it starts out as cross-level theory and 
“ends” with the fusion of international and domestic levels of analysis. “Bridge­
building” is an inappropriate metaphor for this exercise. The islands that are 
being connected in two-level games and second-image reversed approaches are 
now being merged into one. Structural geology replaces civic engineering.
Many scholars will immediately disagree with the formulation presented above. 
After all, the world is organized into tenitorially exclusive, sovereign nation­
states. While these states operate within an interdependent environment, they 
retain the ultimate right to decide. This is the essence of sovereignty. The 
global economy is integrated, the international division of labor is specialized, 
but the overall political structure of the world is decentralized. Some authors 
lament this fact, claiming that our political structures are outmoded, slow to 
catch up with our high-speed economy, unsuited to a world of open borders and 
rapid economic change. Computers, satellites, and the virtually instantaneous 




























































































Others celebrate this world, pointing out that it is highly functional for 
capitalism (it fosters competition, accents regulatory differences, gives practical 
meaning to “exit”), and conserves multiple traditions of diversity and freedom. 
A world of many states is likely to preserve a multicultural world and prevent a 
single, inevitably hegemonic, yardstick from being applied to all.. Whichever 
way the normative evaluation goes, the world system is still seen as “state­
centric”. Interdependence and limitations on autonomy “yes” but the erosion of 
state sovereignty “no”.
Nevertheless, I pursue a more radical metaphor in this section, a metaphor of 
political integration among states not based on interdependence but more on a 
structural merger of their constituting principles, i.e. their constitutions. To give 
focus to this discussion, I will direct my comments to Western Europe, 
specifically to the fifteen member states of the European Community. While 
domestification (and constitutionalization) may apply to other parts of the 
world, its greatest relevance is to Western Europe. From the standpoint of the 
integrated rule of law, the EC is the most highly developed region of the world. 
Yet, some scholars treat Europe as if it were unique and required a theory sui 
generis. My presumption is the opposite, namely, that Europe, while 
“advanced” on the issues of concern here, is not qualitatively different from 
many other parts of the world, and that other parts of the world will experience 
pressures toward a thickening of the legal and institutional environment that 
Europe has felt earlier and more intensely.
In the remainder of this section I provide a sketch of the essentials of the 
process of constitutionalization at the international level. This process 
inevitably involves the creation of an international state and the redefinition of 
the domestic state. While this international state is limited (in membership, 
explicit authority, scope of competences, and especially powers to tax and 
spend), it is, nevertheless, in political and legal terms, a state.15 We often 
“miss” this emerging state because we expect it to look like formal government 
first of all, and secondly, we expect it to look like the Westphalian state in 
miniature. The emerging European state is not at all an embryo of established 
nation states. Its basic structure, or template, is quite different. It does not have 
a core government, a strong centralized bureaucracy, nor authority structures 
radiating out from a center to all reaches of its jurisdiction. It has almost no 
power to tax and spend. It is not an issue of “immature state” or “not enough 
time to develop”, standard assertions often used to “explain” why the European 
political structure does not look like that of France, Italy, the United Kingdom,




























































































or Belgium. This state, powerful as it is, is not following the developmental 
outlines of nation states that exist today.
The Westphalian state system, which is first of all an ideal, refers to the system 
of territorially exclusive nation states each of which has an internal monopoly 
of force and the ultimate right to decide with regard to its internal affairs. 
Rights are completely separate from capacities so there should be no confusion 
that since a state has a particular right, this confers a commensurate ability. 
Sovereign rights confer recognition, provide claims to membership in 
international organizations, and access to resources from other states. 
Sovereignty also implies a right to domestic non-interference. States may differ 
radically in their internal arrangements and external powers but they all have 
sovereignty. This much is definitional. Sovereignty is required to play the 
game.
The Westphalian system simultaneously creates two orders, a domestic one and 
an international one. Within the state, rulers can make laws, implement them, 
and punish infractions by relying on police powers. The domestic order is 
hierarchical or vertical. The sovereign has the authority to make and execute 
laws. In domestic politics, laws are binding in the end because they can be 
enforced, regardless of whether or not they are legitimately made. The positivist 
critique of international law is that, since there is no international sovereign, 
laws cannot always be enforced, and if they cannot be enforced, they are not 
laws at all. In contrast to the domestic order, the international system is 
arranged horizontally. In legal terms, states are equal. One state does not stand 
toward another in the manner of a sovereign to its subjects but rather as one 
sovereign to another. Despite occasional extra-territorial attempts to enforce 
national policies, states do not pass laws that they expect citizens of other 
countries to obey. By the same logic, citizens of one country do not ordinarily 
expect to derive benefits from the laws of another.16 The German word for 
citizenship, Staatsangehoerigkeit, means “belonging to a state”, suggesting that 
rights and duties flow from membership in sovereign political communities and 
are not conceivable outside of these communities. However, it is precisely the 
above claims related to sovereignty and citizenship that are being severely 
challenged today. These challenges are not being made abstractly but on quite 
concrete and practical grounds, often having to do with difficulties encountered
16 Of course, citizens of one country routinely derive benefits from those of another
indirectly, as a result of the ways that rules in one country affect economic performance, 
whose effects in turn are transmitted to another country. For example, if state A 
establishes a central bank, or revises its rules regarding monopolies, these rule changes 





























































































in travel across borders, working in “foreign” countries and making and 
enforcing contracts outside one’s home state.
Two central principles can be distilled from this brief discussion of the 
Westphalian state. First, since it is only states that have legal personality, it 
follows that only states can enter into international agreements and, in turn, that 
states exclusively can create binding rights and obligations. Individuals, private 
corporations, interest groups and so on do not have such legal personality at the 
international level and hence can’t claim remedies before international 
tribunals. The second principle concerns the lack of a clear hierarchy between 
domestic and international law. Two different legal orders exist.17 If a rule 
from one order conflicts with a rule from another, a procedure (a rule) is needed 
to resolve the dispute. In principle, and in practice, the meta-rule may decide in 
favor of domestic law, international law, or either one depending on some 
circumstance, such as which law has become effective the more recently (lex 
posteriori).
These two principles -the  legal personality of states and lack of a clear 
hierarchy between domestic and international law—are central to the 
Westphalian model of statehood. Yet is it just these two principles that are 
challenged by our third method of overcoming the comparative-international 
divide. The central organizing concept, one that subsumes both changes in state 
agency and the indeterminate relationship between domestic and international 
law, is constitutionalization18.
Constitutionalization refers to a process by which a treaty, an international 
agreement, entered into by states, becomes relevant for individuals within these 
states. In more elaborate terms, and in reference to the European Community 
specifically, the constitutionalization of the treaty system, “... refers to the 
process by which the EC treaties have evolved from a set of legal arrangements 
binding upon sovereign states, into a vertically integrated regime conferring 
judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, 
public and private, within EC territory. The phrase captures the transformation 
of an intergovernmental organization governed by international law into a
17 I am simplifying here, recognizing that both dualist and monist traditions of law exist. 
The Netherlands, for example, has a monist tradition and was one of the first members of 
the European Community to accept the superiority of EC law. See Mattli and Slaughter 
(1996).
18 The concept of “constitutionalization” is used and explained by Federico Mancini (1991). 
It is extensively elaborated by Stone Sweet (1994). Also see Stone Sweet (1995); and 




























































































multi-tiered system of governance founded on higher law constitutionalism.” 
(Stone Sweet and Caporaso, 1996:13)19
Constitutionalization implies deep integration. It entails a process whereby the 
Treaties entered into by member states, i.e. compacts among sovereigns, 
(Treaty of Rome, Treaty on European Union) become relevant for the 
individuals within those states. While this process did not occur overnight, 
there are some punctuation points. Since the early sixties, the domestification of 
the European polity has been proceeding, quietly at first, then later with greater 
fanfare, attention, and conflict. Its first moves forward, embodied in the 
judgements setting forth the doctrines of “direct effect” and “supremacy”, took 
place in 1963 and 1964, were dramatic only with hindsight. By the eighties, the 
European Court of Justice had set forth a significant jurisprudence covering 
substantial areas of policy. Apart from the content of these decisions, 
interesting in its own regard, this jurisprudence is important in a formal sense. 
The Court’s activist agenda wrought a jurisprudence that effectively challenged 
the two cornerstones of international law discussed previously: that 
international law refers to compacts among sovereigns; and that there is no 
clear hierarchy of norms between national and international law.
How did this remarkable process, this deep transformation in the relationship 
between domestic and international law, take place? Much energy has been 
spent in argument over whether the ECJ or national governments initiated and 
controlled the process. Far more interesting are the results, and the ongoing 
process itself, which no doubt requires collaboration between supranational 
institutions such as the Court and the Commission, as well as national 
executives, legislatures, and courts. The ECJ was responsible for developing 
two lines of jurisprudence that set this transformation in motion, one 
concerning “direct effect” and the other “superiority” of European law over 
national laws. Direct effect takes on importance in that it addresses the 
limitations of international law flowing from the fact that sovereignty confers 
legal personality on states. Superiority deals with the relationship between 
national and Community law.
Simplifying greatly, the Court progressively made the Treaties relevant to 
individuals, firms, and other private actors. In the Van Gend en Loos (1963) 
case, the ECJ declared that the provisions of the Rome Treaty created direct 
effects, i.e. that these provisions created rights and responsibilities for 
individuals without supplementary actions by national political institutions to
*9 See also the extensive discussion by Stone Sweet in “Constitutional Dialogues in the 




























































































translate Treaty provisions into domestic law. In doing this, the Court 
propounded a radical doctrine, broke down a partition between international 
and domestic law, and created a mechanism to provide judicial remedies for 
individuals acting with reference to international laws.
Fragments of this constitutionalized Treaty can be seen in the Court’s 
Judgement:
“The objectives of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the 
functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies 
that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations 
between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty 
which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more 
specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the 
exercise o f which affects Member States and also their citizens. ” (European Court 
Review, 1963:1)
Before the Van Gend en Loos case, member states could sue one another and 
the Commission of the European Community could bring actions against 
member states. Against this standard, the doctrine of direct effect confers on 
individuals rights and responsibilities that must be respected by public 
authorities and can be enforced in national courts (Stone Sweet and 
Caporaso:14). National courts enter the picture through the “preliminary 
reference procedure” (article 177) . When a national court has before it a case 
for which EC law may be relevant, the presiding national judge may (or in 
some cases must) ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the matter. This ruling 
is then applied by the national judge to the “domestic” case at hand. The vast 
bulk of the Court’s case load is driven by the “preliminary reference” 
procedure, a process that at once lessens the antagonism and distinctiveness of 
national and international courts.
Since the Van Gend case, the Court has thickened its jurisprudence of direct 
effect by extending this doctrine from Treaty Provisions to Directives (Van 
Duyn, 1974) and other classes of secondary legislation. In 1983, the Court 
announced the doctrine of “indirect effect”, which responded to a gap in the 
ability to sue another private actor. By instructing national judges to interpret 
national laws as if they were in conformity to Community law, the Court 
empowered national judges to rewrite national legislation. Once national laws 
are so rewritten, private persons can use EC law in litigation against one 
another. What started out as a thin wedge of constitutionalization of important 
Treaty provisions, has become a thick jurisprudence connecting individuals to 
Community law. Furthermore, this constitutional process does not present itself 
as an external force, intruding into domestic life in an alien way. Through the 




























































































law is also the development of domestic law. The Court has discovered, or 
evolved, a decentralized enforcement mechanism that relies on the initiatives of 
self-interested actors, acting through their own national courts, which are 
themselves connected in an organic way to the ECJ (Stone Sweet and 
Caporaso, 1996:15).
In expounding direct effect, the ECJ revolutionized the relationship between 
domestic and international law. By providing individuals with judicial remedies 
and legal standing, it significantly closed the gap between treaty law and 
municipal law. Yet, conferring rights and responsibilities on individuals would 
not by itself have much legal force if municipal law could override Community 
law. Direct effect cannot realize its full effect in isolation from the superiority 
principle itself. Its consequences are felt only in conjunction with progress in 
the superiority of Community law.
These two principles — direct effect and supremacy- go together, logically and 
in terms of the ECJ’s jurisprudence. In 1964 (one year after Van Gend en Loos) 
the Court examined a case involving an Italian citizen (Costa) and a public 
utility company. Mr. Costa refused to pay a $3.00 utility bill saying his rights 
under the Rome Treaty (under article 37, having to do with discrimination) had 
been violated. The Italian Constitutional Court heard the case first and was 
immediately faced with a contradiction between Community law and the Italian 
law. Since no clear hierarchy of norms existed, the Italian Court argued that lex 
posteriori controlled. Since the Italian legislation establishing the public utility 
was subsequent to the Rome Treaty, Costa lost his case. After this decision, the 
ECJ tried the case and also found Costa’s claims wanting but did not agree with 
the reasoning of the Italian Court. In announcing its decision, the ECJ asserted 
its doctrine of supremacy, and at the same time necessarily repudiated all 
national lex posteriori doctrines to the extent that they contradicted European 
Community law (Stone Sweet, 1995:9-10).
The ramifications of the supremacy doctrine, in conjunction with direct effect, 
are profound.
The supremacy doctrine lays down that in any conflict between an EC legal rule 
and a national law, the European rule has sway. In the Simmenthal II case 
(1978), the Court argued that at the moment an EC rule comes into effect, it 
“renders automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of ...national 
law”. (Simmenthal, 1978)20 National courts did not take this doctrine lying 
down and intense battles ensued in Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The




























































































Court’s jurisprudence asserted Community law as superior to domestic law, 
eliminated the lex posteriori doctrine, and called into serious question domestic 
prohibitions on constitutional review of legislative acts. Given the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty in most member states, the assertion of judicial 
review (at the international level) was strong medicine for national courts and 
legislatures to take.
It is important to reflect on these legal developments in Europe for their 
significance there and for what they might portend in the rest of the world. 
These developments amount to what Joseph Weiler has called “A Quiet 
Revolution” in Western Europe (Weiler, 1994). The organization of the world 
into sovereign states has meant that, legally, states have been the most 
important units, the ones with the right to make and break treaties. The 
pronouncement and expansion of direct effect pierces a hole in the legal armor 
of states and opens a transnational space for individuals and groups to seek 
international redress for alleged wrongs against them. Unfair labor practices, 
gender discrimination in the workplace, violations of maternity rights (again 
limited to ties to the labor market), violations of competition laws, and 
restriction on free movement are just some of the legal grounds that might serve 
to organize litigation for individuals and groups. In short, direct effect confers 
legal status on individuals in international law, or what the ECJ chooses to 
characterize as a new “Community legal order”, separate from both domestic 
law and conventional international law. This is indeed a revolutionary 
development and one that erodes one of the mainstays of the Westphalian state 
system.
Conclusions and Further Discussion
In this article, I have presented three stylized accounts of how the domestic and 
international levels can be linked. Throughout, I have insisted that ontology and 
theory are distinct though related enterprises. In any large-scale social process, 
smaller units make up larger ones, almost as a matter of definition. Thus, Lhe 
international system is made up of states, which are in turn made up of sub­
national units such as provinces, which are in turn made up towns, then 
families, and individuals. Recognizing that wholes are made up of parts 
commits oneself to an ontological reductionism in a straightforward accounting 
sense. However, this is quite different from saying that a theory of the workings 
of system x (say the modern international system) is dispensable since one can 
substitute for it a theory written in terms of the constituent units. This is 
theoretical reductionism. I have committed myself to an individualist ontology 




























































































think theoretical reduction is fallacious but because I think it is unlikely to 
succeed here. Explanation in terms of smaller units is not more basic, 
satisfying, or better on a priori grounds. Terms such as division of labor, 
hierarchy, and multipolar are decomposible only by greatly altering the 
meaning of words, and how they are used in a particular theory.
Of the three approaches I have dealt with, one is suited for the analysis of 
particular events (two-level games), one for cross-level processes (second- 
image reversed theories), and for one institutional integration (domestification). 
Two-level games are uniquely appropriate for situations in which there are at 
least two distinct governments at odds over some issue, but where negotiations 
could in principle yield joint gains. Also, we must be looking at situations 
where strategies are relevant, i.e. where it makes sense to look at outcomes as 
dependent on what others do as well as one’s own action. Given these 
conditions, the logic of two-level games can be quite illuminating.
Double-Edged Diplomacy, and the forerunner article "Diplomacy and domestic 
politics: The logic of two-level games," have already generated a considerable 
research program.21 Much of this work is of an applied nature but, as in the 
edited book, we learn a great deal about bargaining strategies, the relationship 
between constituents and leaders, and the conditions under which bargaining 
success occurs. Theoretical innovations also take place, as in Iida's introduction 
of "analytic uncertainty" into the two-level game model. Less work has 
occurred as part of a research program spurred by Commerce and Coalitions,22 
While it is still early (recall that the Double-Edged Diplomacy book was 
preceded by Putnam's 1988 article), it would be a shame if comparative and 
international political economy lost the opportunity to follow up this important 
piece of research.
1 will close by offering some suggestions about the future directions in which 
research might go, focusing first on the two-level game. This model could 
profit by a rigorous comparative exploration of the logics of partial and 
sequential games, with the general equilibrium logic and simultaneous 
modeling advanced in the book. As inuicated earlier, I think there is more 
promise for the partial approach than is reflected by the contributors to Double- 
Edged Diplomacy. Second, comparisons of the two-level game with the 
standard one-level, unitary rational actor bargaining model might be useful. 
Carrying out these comparisons amounts to a suggestion that the importance of
21 For a sample of these works, see Huelshoff (1994); Iida (1993a); Iida (1993b); Schoppa 
(1993); and Lehman and McCoy (1992).




























































































the two-level game should be gauged in value-added terms, as an improvement 
over the predictions of standard bargaining models.
Conventional international relations theory adopts a unitary rational actor 
viewpoint. Many critics point to the descriptive richness of domestic politics 
and rest their case here, ignoring the more important next step of demonstrating 
what difference this complexity makes for international relations. This is a 
critical step, since as Achen points out, it is possible to model a complex 
domestic environment with a single decisionmaker (Achen, 1988). So the 
critical question is how can we model negotiation processes in a way that is 
consistent with domestic politics and under what circumstances might this 
imply the necessity of a two-game approach? We can distinguish at least three 
different cases. The first is the one normally cited by realist theory, namely that 
we have the overriding force of the international system (an external crisis, a 
war or threat of war) and domestic politics simply fade away. Government 
agents act on their own because they believe they in fact act on behalf of all. 
The second situation involves cases where domestic politics affects the COG's 
preferences. What society wants is transmitted to central decisionmakers who 
quickly adopt the wishes of the populace. In the limiting case, the COG is a 
pure agent whose utility function is identical with that of his constituents. In the 
third and most interesting case, COG preferences differ from those of society. 
In the first and second cases, domestic politics, even if it counts, is dispensable, 
since domestic preferences are transmitted to COGs. In the third case, however, 
the COG simultaneously represents domestic constituents and searches for 
acceptable deals with counterparts abroad. He must find bargains that are 
acceptable to other COGs that can also be ratified domestically.
Within this third category, we can distinguish different types of cases. If COG 
preferences are different from constituents, then a two-level approach is 
illuminating, though it reduces to a kind of constrained maximization. The 
COG would first (arbitrarily) find those outcomes acceptable by himself and 
COG partners, then arrange the remaining outcomes in order of COG and 
constituent preferences. The chosen outcome would be the one that is highest 
(by some algorithm, e.g., the mean of the two preferences) for both.
Two general points emerge. The first is that the existence of domestic politics 
(in the sense of different actors pursuing different goals through different 
channels, goals that may not easily collapse into one overall preference 
ordering) does not necessarily imply a two-game approach. Second, to the 
extent that preferences diverge (preferences between COGs and domestic 
actors) and to the extent that they are changeable, through hand-tying or 




























































































What about the research program flowing from Commerce and Coalitions'? 
Picking up on an earlier point, the gaps most in need of filling lie between the 
initial trade-induced inequalities and political outcomes defined in various 
ways: electoral changes, patterns of change in group mobilization, policy 
changes, and social-political realignments. How do objective changes in the 
distribution of national income, between labor and capital in particular, work 
their way through the political system? Cleavages do not automatically result in 
group mobilization. Information about one’s position and how it is shared by 
others, i.e. a sense of common predicament, are required. This is likely to be a 
subjective process in which ideas as well as interests play a key role. Objective 
changes in national income, even if they hit some groups demonstrably harder, 
do not automatically translate into identifiable changes in politics and public 
policy. Workers, faced with job loss, may not be able to identify the underlying 
causes. The foreclosure officers of the local bank or teachers of global 
education in the high schools may be singled out as villains. Scapegoating and 
expression of generalized political discontent, i.e. anomic violence rather than 
purposeful political organization with clear goals and targets, may be the rule. 
So the first step in Rogowski’s model (recognition of the problem) is not trivial.
What makes a difference for effective organization? Does the geographic 
concentration of factoral changes count? If labor is the disadvantaged factor, as 
it seems likely in the United States, does it matter if job loss is spread thinly 
throughout the country, or concentrated in the upper Midwest or Northeast? 
What counts? Is it the perceived importance of the industry or service to the 
country (say steel vs. textiles), the demographic makeup of disadvantaged 
groups (women, Blacks, the very young and very old), the links of these 
disadvantaged groups to Senators and Representatives in the Congress, or the 
leverage of these groups with the electoral college?
A second area where work is needed lies in a more fine-grained analysis of the 
productive factors, a point well-recognized by Rogowski. Labor and capital are 
too broad. They may serve as “first-cut” approximations, but they will have to 
give way to analyses based on various gradations of skilled and unskilled labor 
and capital that vary along numerous dimensions: asset specificity, mobility, 
degree of technical change, and knowledge-intensiveness. As labor and capital 
are disaggregated into finer groupings, these groupings will take on some of the 
features of the sectoral approach. Nevertheless, it is at this more specific level 
that the interesting political work is likely to be done.
Unlike the first two approaches, the third one relies partially on a domestic 
analogy whereby the separate units (states) integrate with one another to form a 




























































































the constituent states, a larger version built on the same architectural principles, 
or proceeds down a different developmental path in historically novel ways, is 
not the main point here. What concerns us is that separate states, independent 
and not possessed of a common government, transform themselves, modify 
their sovereign capabilities, and merge in significant ways. The seeds of this 
approach are present in Bull’s work on “anarchical society”, even though Bull 
himself was not a proponent of the domestic analogy.
However, within the fifteen member states of the European Community, the 
domestic analogy goes beyond a society of independent states existing in an 
anarchy. Instead, we see the development of common rules and understandings, 
shared political institutions, even a constitution which interprets the Treaty 
framework so as to make key provisions relevant for individuals. In so doing, 
the ECJ has carved out a niche, a transnational niche, for individuals to bring 
complaints before an international tribunal.
I have used the domestic analogy in a suggestive and metaphorical way only, as 
a source of insight and hypothesis rather than as a source of proof. I reject the 
strong meaning of “analogy” attached to it by Suganami (Suganami, 1989), that 
the conditions of domestic order must be the same at the international level. In 
so doing, I cast my lot with Bull (1977), Manning (1972), and even (on certain 
reading) Hobbes ({1651} 1962), all of whom see the international condition as 
somewhat distinct from the state of nature of people without a government.
But to concede that important differences exist is not to deny similarities. States 
also benefit from a system of common understandings, habits, and taken for 
granted procedures and rules. Whether these rules and procedures take the form 
of a complex system of coordination providing rules of the road for parallel but 
constitutionally distinct units, or a vertically organized system of law, a 
hierarchy of norms akin to domestic law, remains to be seen. Both types of 
order already exist in Europe and there is no reason why one or the other must 
triumph. In as sense, this issue is being actively debated within Europe today, 
in the controversy stirred up by the German Court’s pronouncement that the 
European Community is a Staatenbund not a Bundesstaat (a confederation of 
states not a federal state).
In this article, I have emphasized the ways in which Europe has become 
“polity-like”. A powerful civil society exists at the transnational level as well as 
an emerging international government constructed on the basis of common 
rules. Europe is not only a society in Bull’s sense, it is also an emerging polity. 
The nature of this polity has been strongly shaped by the authority which the 
members states have been willing to delegate and by the power of the ECJ to 




























































































implies interest groups; delegation implies experts; and law implies courts and 
judges. Europe has plenty of all three. This fact alone speaks volumes about the 
nature of the international state, a state where interest groups, judges, experts, 
and national representatives meeting regularly decide European policy — policy 
not in the sense of compacts among states but as laws binding on individuals 
and public authorities. Despite all the difference between this state and pre­
existing ones, the international state I am describing qualifies in the simple 
sense that it is a system of public authority with the capacity for making, 
interpreting, and implementing binding laws. The members of the EC may 
operate in an environment that is intergovernmental but it is not anarchic; they 
pursue their “own” interests but not within a system of self-help.
The final approach, raises profound questions for the entire discipline of 
international politics.
International politics have been conceived as the politics among sovereign, 
territorially organized nations states. Legally, the system of sovereign states is 
horizontally organized while, at the same time, power-political relations are 
organized vertically. One central question that has divided lawyers from realists 
concerns the extent to which a system or rules (a legal system) can spread to 
encompass relations among states that were previously governed by power, 
either military power or the power of the market States have already to a large 
extent “lost” the capacity to control their own borders, at least in terms of 
economic interactions. To a large extent, this capacity has been consciously 
given away, partly in the interest of efficiency. This has been a political process 
too, not just an efficiency project, with holders of mobile forms of capital 
benefiting more than others. In addition, territoriality, that central constitutive 
principle of the Westphalian system, has been called into question. In the area 
of social policy, not even one of the most developed in the European 
Community, states have conceded extra-territoriality in many ways, allowing 
beneficiaries who are not nationals even as they continue to support their own 
citizens while they work in other countries. As Leibfried and Pierson (Leibfried 
and Pierson, 1995) have shown, state control over beneficiaries, the types of 
benefits, and place of consumption (of benefits) have all deteriorated in the 
wake of even small movements in the labor market and market compatibility 
requirements of the single market And finally, even sovereignty, considered as 
the ultimate right to decide, is thrown open to question given the power of the 
ECJ, the supremacy doctrine, and the growing hierarchy of norms among the 
national and European levels. While these forces are far from having played 
themselves out, the assault on sovereignty has gone furthest in Western Europe. 
This part of the world will continue to be the site where the contests between 




























































































true, it will be Europe that will tell us a great deal about the appropriateness of 
our scholarly paradigms in the years ahead.
James A. Caporaso,
Department of Political Science, 
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